

TWENTY-SECOND REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING COMMISSION

**Presented to the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Government of Ireland under Articles 4 and 7 of the International
Agreement establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission**

October 2009

CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Paramilitary Groups: Assessment of Current Activities
3. Paramilitary Groups: The Incidence of Violence
4. Leadership
5. The Devolution of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly
and Executive
6. Other Issues

ANNEXES

- I Articles 4 and 7 of the International Agreement
- II The IMC's Guiding Principles
- III The Geographical Distribution of Paramilitary Violence – Maps in Section 3
– Technical Note and Key to Local Government Districts

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 We present this report on the continuing activities of paramilitary groups under Articles 4 and 7 of the International Agreement establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission¹.

1.2 In accordance with the terms of the International Agreement this report comes six months after our previous full report on paramilitary activity of May 2009². It focuses mainly on the six month period 1 March to 31 August 2009.

1.3 Two things have been central to all our work:

- First is the objective of the Commission set out in Article 3 of the International Agreement;

The objective of the Commission is to carry out [its functions] with a view to promoting the transition to a peaceful society and stable and inclusive devolved Government in Northern Ireland.

- Second are the principles about the rule of law and democratic government which we published in March 2004 and which we set out in Annex II.

1.4 We repeat three points we have made before about the nature of our work:

- We have explained how we approach our task³. We believe that our methods are fair and thorough; we take great care in our assessments; and we have always tried to learn from the experience gained in each

¹ The text of Articles 4 and 7 is in Annex I.

² IMC Twenty-First Report, May 2009.

³ IMC Fifth Report, May 2005, paragraphs 1.9-1.13.

report and from what people have said to us about them. We welcome frank comment, as much on this report as on its predecessors;

- The report addresses the situation in Northern Ireland as a whole, and we appreciate that the situation varies very considerably from place to place. People may therefore find that the picture we paint does not tally with their personal experience;
- The views we express in our reports are ours alone. We are independent and expect to be judged by what we say. We do not make statements of official policy. It is for the two Governments and, if appropriate, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, to decide how to respond to our reports.

2. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES

2.1 We set out below our assessment of the current activities and state of preparedness of paramilitary groups. We focus on the six months from 1 March to 31 August 2009. The assessment extends those we have given in previous such reports, to which the reader can refer for a comprehensive account of our views over the five and a half years since we started reporting in April 2004⁴. Our First Report gave an account of the origins of the groups and their structures at that time.

A. REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY GROUPS

Dissident Republicans Generally

2.2 We first give an overview of dissident republican activity. We also continue the practice we have followed since our Twelfth Report in October 2006 of looking separately at the activities of the larger organisations and at those activities for which smaller dissident republican groupings were responsible and those which we could not at the time confidently attribute. It does however need to be understood that there have been some changes in the overall pattern, in particular that some activities have involved co-operation between individuals from different groups without there being strategic co-operation by their leadership.

2.3 In the overview of dissident republican activity over the six months then under review which we gave in our previous report we said that:

- CIRA and RIRA had remained extremely active and dangerous. Both had engaged in a high level of violence, often with the intention of murdering

⁴ We have produced two kinds of reports under Article 4. Of the 16 hitherto, 13 have covered the activities of all the groups. These were our First (April 2004), Third (November 2004), Fifth (May 2005), Seventh (October 2005), Eighth (February 2006), Tenth (April 2006), Twelfth (October 2006), Thirteenth (January 2007), Fifteenth (April 2007), Seventeenth (November 2007), Eighteenth (May 2008), Twentieth (November 2008) and Twenty-First (May 2009). The three other reports under Article 4 were ad hoc ones. The first two of these were produced at our own initiative: our Fourth (February 2005) which dealt with the Northern Bank robbery and our Sixth (September 2005) which dealt with the UVF/LVF feud. The third ad hoc report was at the request of the British and Irish Governments: our Nineteenth (September 2008) which dealt with the issue of the leadership of PIRA.

members of the security forces and placing the lives of members of the general public at peril. Dissident republican activity since the early summer of 2008 had been consistently more serious than at any time since we had started to report in April 2004;

- These activities represented a challenging of the peace process by groups always violently opposed to it, but not an unravelling of that process. The unanimity of the condemnation of the murders of Sappers Quinsey and Azimkar on 7 March 2009 and of PC Carroll two days later had been a striking indication of the robustness of the process;
- The continued vigorous and courageous activities of law enforcement agencies and others on both sides of the border remained as essential in combating dissident activity as their successes to date had been important.

2.4 Because of the seriousness of these events we included in our Twenty-First Report a brief conspectus of dissident republican activity over the five years since we had started reporting⁵.

2.5 Our detailed analysis of the activities of CIRA and RIRA below shows that during the period under review the threat was very serious. The overall level of dissident activity was markedly higher than we have seen since we first met in late 2003. The seriousness, range and tempo of their activities all changed for the worse in these six months.

2.6 During this period dissident republicans were violent and showed an intent to kill if the opportunity arose. The three murders in March were by far the most serious incidents but there were many others involving extreme ruthlessness. A number of the incidents for which dissidents were responsible demonstrated a capability to plan and organise which adds to the threat they present. They pose a major challenge to the law enforcement and other agencies on both sides of the border.

⁵ IMC Twenty-First Report, May 2009, Annex III, pages 31-34.

Had it not been for the work of all these agencies North and South, more lives would have been lost.

2.7 There are two aspects bearing on the capability of dissident republicans to which we must refer. First, in previous reports we have often mentioned attempts by dissident republican groups to recruit new members. In our detailed analysis below we comment on the apparent growth of RIRA and CIRA as a result of recruitment. But, as we also say there, what really matters is not so much the number of members as the experience and skills of those available to an organisation, whether formally members or not. The majority of new recruits are inexperienced young males. There are however now indications that former republican terrorists have as individuals provided services in some instances to dissident republican groups, which even if occasional can significantly add to the threat⁶. There have also been clear attempts on the part of dissidents to extend their influence in some areas, whether on the basis of support or through fear and intimidation. We shall continue to monitor such trends very closely.

2.8 Second, it remains our view that there has not been effective strategic collaboration between the main dissident groups, though all direct their attention to attempts to kill members of the security forces and their families as well as attempts to intimidate and control communities. There also continues to be ad hoc tactical co-operation between individuals from different groups and backgrounds. This form of tactical co-operation involves personal and social networks rather than the organisations themselves and has been significant in the period under review. The picture is not altogether clear at present, but there are emerging signs that phenomenon of fluidity is more significant than before.

⁶ We think for example that this was the case with the murders of two soldiers on 7 March 2009 and the hijackings in March and July – see paragraphs 2.26-2.27 and 2.32 below respectively. A further example was the hijacking of a delivery van in Lurgan in mid July when shots were fired at the PSNI officers who responded to the incident; we do not think that all those involved were necessarily aligned to one organisation.

- 2.9 We have no further matters to report in respect of the Strabane group styling itself Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH)⁷, the Irish Republican Liberation Army (IRLA) or Saor Uladh (SU).
- 2.10 As regards *éirígí*, we have said in recent reports that we believed it was a political group with a focus on aggressive protest rather than a paramilitary group. We have also pointed out that amongst its members or former members there were some who may have been involved in serious violence. We do not change this overall assessment. We note that some of its members are elected local representatives. We do not believe that its leaders direct acts of terrorism, but we note its ambiguous attitude towards the use of physical force, which it has not condemned.
- 2.11 Finally, we note that a factor behind the increase in the number of attacks in some nationalist areas appears to have been the growth of vigilante organisations which claim to want to “clean up” (their term) anti-social behaviour. Two such groupings are Concerned Families Against Drugs in Belfast and Republican Action Against Drugs in Derry. We believe that both these groups have undertaken attacks, including the use of pipe-bombs.
- 2.12 The violence of the dissidents over the six months under review is an attack on the peaceful political approach adopted by Sinn Féin and is designed to affect policing and to raise public fears about security.

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

- 2.13 In our Twenty-First Report we said that CIRA had been active and highly dangerous in the period under review and we referred to the organisation’s ruthless determination. It had been responsible for a number of incidents which could have led to the loss of life. Members had also been involved in other acts of violence, as they had in a large range of serious crimes. The organisation had sought to

⁷ In our previous report we pointed out that there had been confusion in some parts of the media over the term “ONH”, which was then starting to be used by a faction of RIRA and so was not confined to the dissident republican grouping in the Strabane area which had earlier assumed the name and to which we are referring in this paragraph.

enhance its capability through recruitment, training and weapons procurement. We noted that CIRA had claimed responsibility for the murder of PC Carroll on 9 March 2009 (to which we refer further below).

2.14 We are constrained in what we can say about the murder of PC Carroll in Craigavon on 9 March 2009 because of impending proceedings following a number of arrests. If CIRA are responsible, as they claim to be, for the murder we must note that it marks a further escalation of the organisation's activity. The murder was ruthlessly planned: an incident was engineered to draw the police into the area so that one or more officers could be killed. The incident stands out too as the first time CIRA had claimed to have murdered a police officer. It is evidence of commitment to terrorism, determination and careful planning.

2.15 CIRA was responsible for a number of other serious incidents, including:

- In early April, following calls to the media and others, an elaborate hoax explosive device was discovered at Rosslea; we believe CIRA was responsible for it and may have been attempting to lure security force personnel into the area in preparation for an attack;
- In July members deployed an explosive device in Armagh possibly intended to kill the bomb disposal officer sent to defuse it⁸;
- The PSNI made finds of material which we believe belonged to CIRA: in April and again in May they discovered ammunition and bomb-making equipment in Belfast.

2.16 Members of CIRA were responsible for assaults and intimidation, often in connection with perceived anti-social behaviour. There were a number of incidents of violent intimidation. In one instance entry was forced into a house in Lurgan with hammers in July, damaging the contents and telling the occupants they had 48 hours to leave. We believe that other instances included firing shots into a window,

⁸ In the event the device exploded of its own accord and no damage occurred.

committing criminal damage and spraying graffiti, and the armed intimidation of the occupants of a house.

2.17 CIRA members were extensively involved in a range of serious crime, including armed robbery, “tiger” kidnapping, smuggling, extortion and fuel laundering.

2.18 CIRA also sought to enhance the organisation’s capability. It made efforts to train members, including in the use and manufacture of explosive devices. It increased its numbers through recruitment. It targeted members of the security forces on and off duty, almost certainly with the intention of being able to mount future attacks. And it continued to make attempts to procure weapons. Overall, there was a continued high level of covert activity. At the same time, there are indications of some dislocation in the leadership of CIRA (and of Republican Sinn Féin).

2.19 We conclude that CIRA remains in a state of heightened activity, is ruthless, violent and is prepared to kill, and is committed to undermining the peace process and community-based policing.

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)

2.20 In our Twenty-First Report we said that members of INLA had remained deeply involved in serious crime, notably extortion. We believed that INLA remained a threat and that it was no less capable of violence than it had been in the recent past.

2.21 Members remained involved in a similar range of serious crime in the six months under review but we have no specific incidents of a terrorist kind to report. Despite this, we have no reason at present to change our conclusion that the organisation remains capable of violence. Nevertheless, the INLA announced on 11 October 2009 (outside the period under review) that the armed struggle was over and that its aims would best be advanced through exclusively peaceful political struggle. This announcement, while welcome in itself, will be convincing only with evidence of the decommissioning of arms and the ending of criminal activity.

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

2.22 In our Twenty-First Report we said that the assessment we had made in the autumn of 2008 still held good⁹. PIRA remained on an exclusively political path; we believed that it would continue to do so and that the organisation would be allowed to wither away; the so-called “military” departments had been disbanded and the former terrorist capability had been lost; the organisation was not involved in illegal activity, although contrary to instructions and for personal gain some individual members were; by conscious decision the Army Council was being allowed to fall into disuse; and PIRA had in these ways completely relinquished the leadership and other structures appropriate to a time of conflict.

2.23 There are two main aspects to our assessment for the period 1 March to 31 August 2009. First, we do not believe that PIRA has engaged in terrorist or other illegal activity. Where individuals have engaged in violence or other crime (including against perceived anti-social behaviour) we believe they did so without sanction or support and that any financial gain was personal. There is no indication that such information as is gathered is for a purpose other than maintaining the coherence of the republican movement, including to discourage the movement of members to dissident or other republican protest groups. A small number of former PIRA members have given assistance to dissident republicans. This is not surprising following the dissolution of PIRA’s structures.

2.24 The second aspect is the role of the leadership of the republican movement. The movement has adhered to its strategy. In addition to maintaining its clear stance against all forms of terrorist activity and against the involvement of members in crime, the leadership continued in more specific ways to demonstrate its adherence to the use of peaceful means. It condemned the dissident republican attacks in March and encouraged people to support the police in the apprehension of the perpetrators. It exercised restraint following a loyalist attack on Sinn Féin premises. It actively discouraged members from engaging in public disorder during

⁹ IMC Nineteenth Report, September 2008, paragraphs 2.11-2.14; IMC Twentieth Report, November 2008, paragraph 2.20; and Twenty-First Report, May 2009, paragraphs 2.22-2.24

the parades season and took steps to ensure that its own events were not hijacked by people intent on violence.

2.25 In the light of this we conclude, as we did six months ago, that PIRA has maintained its political course. We believe it will continue to do so.

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

2.26 In our Twenty-First Report we said that both factions of RIRA had been active in the period under review. They had been responsible for a number of life-threatening attacks and members had been involved in other violent incidents. We associated RIRA with the murders of Sappers Quinsey and Azimkar and the wounding of others at the same time in March 2009 (which fell outside our then reporting period and to which we refer further below). We said that they were the culmination of a series of incidents a number of which could have led to the deaths of police officers and members of the public. We referred to efforts to enhance the capability of the organisation, including attempted arms procurement, and described them as further evidence of RIRA's determination and ruthlessness, although we did not think that RIRA was able to mount a consistent and sustained campaign. We concluded that RIRA remained highly dangerous and active.

2.27 RIRA – of which there continue to be two fairly separate factions, each with its own leadership structures - was active and violent in the six months under review. Members of RIRA in association with others were involved in the murder of two soldiers at Massereene Barracks in March 2009 and the wounding of four other people at the same time¹⁰. This represented a major escalation of RIRA activity and was the first time they had murdered members of the security forces.

2.28 RIRA was responsible for other attacks on the security forces:-

- In late May an improvised explosive device was found in Armagh; we believe that members of RIRA were responsible and that the incident was a failed attack on the PSNI;

¹⁰ But see also the comments in paragraph 2.7 above about the involvement of others.

- The following month another improvised explosive device was recovered from Strand Road PSNI station for which we believe RIRA was also responsible;
- In July members of RIRA were, we believe, responsible for incidents during rioting in the Ardoyne when at least one shot was fired at members of the PSNI and improvised explosive devices were thrown at them;
- A RIRA improvised explosive device found at a school in Armagh in late August following a warning may have been intended to maim those who tried to defuse it;
- Three days later, on 31 August, there was an armed robbery at Forkhill apparently designed to lure the police into the area; some days later, following telephone calls, a very substantial improvised explosive device containing 460lbs of home made explosive and operated by a command wire was found where the arriving officers were likely to have passed¹¹. Had the device exploded it could have killed those nearby and caused very major collateral damage, possibly leading to the deaths of members of the public. We believe that RIRA was responsible for this.

2.29 In April RIRA issued a statement in which it claimed among other things the “right” to “execute” anybody providing services to the security forces. The injuring of two civilians in the attack on Massereene Barracks was in line with this statement and RIRA subsequently said that it made no apology for targeting them because they were helping the British Army by delivering pizzas to soldiers. In April RIRA told a newspaper that it would mount an attack in Great Britain when it became opportune to do so. A further indication of intent was the discovery of explosive material following the arrest of a RIRA member in County Leitrim in March. In August RIRA issued threats against members of the Parades Commission.

¹¹ We are aware that early press comment suggested that there was a larger amount of explosive – some 600lb.

2.30 We believe that RIRA members were responsible for sectarian attacks:-

- In July a house in Ballymena belonging to Protestants was damaged in an arson attack;
- In August another house in Ballymena was damaged;
- RIRA members orchestrated rioting in the Ardoyne in mid-July, bringing members from elsewhere in support. They incited young people to become involved.

2.31 RIRA was responsible for a considerable number of shootings and assaults:-

- In March members shot a man in Belfast six times in the legs;
- In May they shot a man four times in the legs at a bus stop in Belfast;
- In June four masked members shot a man in the legs in Belfast;
- Five days later, also in Belfast, another man was shot in the legs by members who burst into his house when he was asleep;
- In August members shot a man in the leg and arm in his home in Dunmurry.

2.32 RIRA also issued threats against members of the general public:-

- In April a number of people were forced from their homes in Belfast under threat of being killed and another was threatened for allegedly working for the Security Service;
- In June a hoax pipe bomb was used to intimidate somebody allegedly involved in anti-social behaviour into leaving their home in Belfast;

- RIRA was also responsible for instigating a series of some 30 hijackings and hoax bomb incidents in Belfast and Lurgan in March; in five of these incidents drivers were told that bombs had been placed in their vehicles and that they should drive to different PSNI stations; a comparable series of some 20 hijackings and hoaxes was perpetrated in July;
- In August armed and masked RIRA members mounted a road block in Meigh, County Armagh, to hand out leaflets threatening anyone who passed information to the PSNI, AGS, the Security Service or Sinn Féin.

2.33 Members were also involved in a similar range of serious crime to members of CIRA. In March a security van in County Tyrone was robbed of some £600,000 by three masked men.

2.34 RIRA continued its efforts to enhance the capability of the organisation by training members, including in the manufacture and use of explosives. It recruited new members and in Belfast expanded its membership; we have not drawn specific conclusions from this because we cannot presently make an assessment of the quality of this recruitment. RIRA continued to target people, primarily members of the security forces, and to seek to gather intelligence. RIRA also continued efforts to procure weapons. Overall, there was a continued high level of covert activity.

2.35 We conclude from this that both factions of RIRA remain in a state of heightened activity; that they are at present determined and ruthless; and that they will not hesitate to use violence, particularly but not only against members of the security forces, and will not hesitate to kill. They are committed to undermining the peace process and community-based policing and present a very serious threat.

B. LOYALIST PARAMILITARY GROUPS

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

2.36 In our Twenty-First Report we repeated the assessment we had been making for some time: the LVF was a small organisation without any political purpose; people

historically linked to it were heavily involved in serious crime, sometimes claiming the LVF's name if they thought it was in their interests to do so; and the proceeds of these crimes were for personal and not organisational gain.

2.37 We have nothing to add to this assessment in respect of the period 1 March to 31 August 2009.

Ulster Defence Association (UDA)

2.38 In our Twenty-First Report we noted the continued division between the mainstream of the UDA and the South East Antrim group. We believed that the leadership of the mainstream remained committed to its statement of November 2007 and that there had been some further progress in implementing it, for example through encouraging people to report incidents to the police. Some members however remained involved in serious crime. We noted that the leadership was area based and not cohesive and that there did not appear to us to be demonstrable short and long term strategic objectives to help give effect to the desire for change. We believed that the lack of cohesion among the leadership of the mainstream would continue to hamper progress and that decommissioning would become an increasingly urgent challenge.

2.39 In its report of September 2009 the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) said that it had witnessed an event in which “a quantity of weapons” belonging to all five UDA “brigades” had been decommissioned¹². It also reported that UDA representatives had said it was the first of a series of events in which they would decommission the remainder of the UDA's arms before the end of the IICD's mandate in February 2010. The IICD said it was in continuing contact with the UDA to arrange further decommissioning and that it had been told there was no difference of opinion within the leadership on the issue.

2.40 The decommissioning to date is an important indication of the intention of the joint leadership to deliver on a policy embracing the organisation as a whole, about

¹² Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 4 September 2009.

which we have expressed some doubts in the past. The decommissioning is therefore welcome. The leadership also took steps to ensure that members did not react improperly in response to dissident republican violence, especially the three murders in March¹³. We recognise too that in some areas (though by no means all) senior figures have taken steps to reduce the level of criminality amongst the membership and in some cases have made impressive and cross-community efforts to improve the situation. In the case of the UDA, the point we make in the second indent of paragraph 1.4 above about the variation from area to area is particularly marked. We urge the entire leadership to demonstrate this same strategic direction. Ensuring the acceptance by the membership of the completion of the decommissioning process as soon as possible is of course of great importance.

2.41 Unfortunately, some members of the UDA have continued to be involved in a wide range of serious criminal activity. We would particularly note the murder of Kevin McDaid in Coleraine in May 2009, when a number of UDA members were involved in the incident which led to his death, though we believe that they acted without leadership sanction¹⁴.

2.42 Other crimes include drug dealing, robbery, extortion and the supply of contraband cigarettes; notwithstanding the efforts of some in the leadership to reduce criminality, some senior figures remain directly involved or give their personal approval. Some members were involved in rioting in Belfast at the end of August. Some also occasionally targeted those they believed to have been involved in anti-social activity. After the dissident republican murders in March 2009 we believe that there was some intelligence gathering about dissidents, in some instances with the knowledge of senior members. We are disturbed that the total of assaults in loyalist areas has sharply increased; UDA members were responsible for a number. Some members ordered people away from the places in which they were living. Some parts of the organisation have continued to recruit young people.

¹³ See paragraphs 2.13-2.14 and 2.26-2.27.

¹⁴ We are constrained in what we can say by the need not to prejudice any judicial proceedings. See also paragraph 2.53 below.

2.43 Overall, we are encouraged by the progress made on decommissioning, though the deadline remains early February 2010. The leadership collectively and individually has given a significant lead to change the organisation. In some areas the leadership has shown remarkable commitment and progress in community development, a fact acknowledged by all sections of the local community in those areas. Across the organisation as a whole, however, much remains to be done. We hope that the recent developments will quickly be followed by the completion of decommissioning and the other steps necessary to demonstrate that the UDA is putting its paramilitary and criminal past behind it.

UDA – South East Antrim Group

2.44 In our Twenty-First Report we said that there had been no major incidents attributable to the South East Antrim group of the UDA. We noted the establishment of the South and East Antrim Community Federation, directed towards community development, and the declared intention to phase out the membership of the South East Antrim UDA group over the following eighteen months to two years. We believed that the decommissioning of weapons was firmly on the group's radar screen.

2.45 We believe that the South East Antrim group of the UDA and the mainstream UDA are now acting as quite separate groups. There have been fewer acts of violence between them in the period under review.

2.46 The IICD reported in September 2009 that it had overseen two events in which "some of the UDA South East Antrim group's weapons, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices were decommissioned"¹⁵. The IICD said that the group's representatives had committed to decommissioning the remainder before the end of its mandate in February 2010 and urged them to do so as soon as possible. We join the IICD in urging the group to complete the process at the earliest possible date.

¹⁵ Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 4 September 2009.

2.47 As in our previous Report, we have no significant incidents to record arising from the collective action of the group. We recognise the support given to community development. But, like members of the mainstream UDA, some continue to be involved in a range of criminal activity. Some members have occasionally targeted those they believed to be involved in anti-social activity and have ordered people out of the area in which they were living. Members have undertaken paramilitary style assaults.

2.48 Six months ago we recorded the commitment to phase out the membership of the group over the period between late 2010 and mid - 2011, though we thought that the timescale was undesirably long. That commitment remains significant. Between a quarter and a third of the time has now passed and we await evidence of material progress. We urge the group to implement that commitment as quickly as possible, and to complete decommissioning at an early date.

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC)

2.49 In our Twenty-First Report we said that the strategy set out in the UVF's May 2007 statement remained in place and that the leadership – which was cohesive - continued to pursue it. We did not believe that there would be any major deviation from this course. There had been further worthwhile progress in reducing the level of criminality among members and in downsizing the organisation. We concluded that the movement of the UVF towards an end point seemed managed and cohesive and that internal discipline looked fairly solid. Decommissioning remained the major outstanding issue although some in the leadership increasingly recognised that it had to be tackled.

2.50 The most significant event in the period under review was the decommissioning of UVF and RHC arms reported by the IICD on 4 September 2009¹⁶. The IICD reported in June 2009 that it had overseen the decommissioning of “substantial quantities of firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices” belonging to the UVF and RHC. It reported that the UVF had said that the material comprised

¹⁶ Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 4 September 2009.

all that was under the control of the two organisations. The IICD concluded that it had completed the decommissioning of UVF and RHC arms.

2.51 The IICD's report marks a very significant and positive development. We note that the UVF leadership had prepared the ground for decommissioning with its members over a considerable period and had maintained internal discipline. We see the event as clear evidence of the organisational coherence and strategic direction to which we have referred in the past. We increasingly see a picture of an organisation on its way to going out of business as a paramilitary organisation, though that might not preclude the maintenance of some form of association for past members.

2.52 Through decommissioning the UVF has passed a very major landmark. It is the most significant indication of both its adherence to the strategy set out in its May 2007 statement and its capacity to deliver. There have continued to be indications of adherence in other respects to the 2007 strategy (though we believe that progress in some of these respects has been more marked in some parts of the organisation than in others). We believe that the leadership took steps to ensure that members did not react improperly in response to dissident republican violence, especially the three murders in March. The organisation has expelled members who have acted in a way unacceptable to the leadership. Senior members have continued to take steps to reduce criminality amongst the membership. We are aware of nothing to suggest that the organisation has engaged in preparatory or other terrorist activity, that it has organised or benefited from other forms of crime, or that there has been material recruitment. We welcome these positive developments though we are concerned at the increase in assaults in loyalist areas in the period under review.

2.53 The significance of decommissioning and the trajectory which it indicates does not mean that all individual UVF members have refrained from criminal activity. We believe that a few UVF members were involved in the events which led to the sectarian murder of Kevin McDaid in May 2009 to which we refer above, though

without leadership sanction¹⁷. UVF members were involved in a small number of sectarian attacks, including against foreign communities in Belfast, and in rioting at the end of August 2009. Despite the views of the leadership, some members were engaged in a wide range of criminal activity throughout Northern Ireland, albeit for personal gain. We cannot rule out that some arms have been retained in some parts of the organisation or that individual members have sought to acquire weapons on an ad hoc basis outside the organisation's strategy.

2.54 Overall therefore, the UVF has made major progress in the six months under review, not least in their substantial and welcome decommissioning event. We expect it to continue to make progress in other respects, including giving active support to the police.

¹⁷ See paragraph 2.41 above. We are constrained in what we can say by the need not to prejudice any judicial proceedings.

3. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE

3.1 Article 4 requires us to monitor trends. In this Section we set out information on the six months 1 March to 31 August 2009 set against similar information for earlier six month periods.

3.2 We know that there are unavoidable limitations in any statistical examination of the incidence of paramilitary violence. These tables of statistics include only those acts of violence which come to the notice of the police, and, as we know well from other sources of information, not all incidents are so reported. It is not possible to quantify intimidation short of actual violence, which may also not be reported and which can have just as traumatic an impact. And nothing we say about the statistics can adequately convey the dreadful experiences of the victims and their families.

3.3 Over the period from 1 March 2003 to 31 August 2009 we believe that the number of *paramilitary murders* was as follows¹⁸:

	1 Mar - 31 Aug 09	1 Sept 08 - 28 Feb 09	1 Mar - 31 Aug 08	1 Sept 07 - 29 Feb 08	1 Mar - 31 Aug 07	1 Sept 06 - 28 Feb 07	1 Mar - 31 Aug 06	1 Sept 05 - 28 Feb 06	1 Mar - 31 Aug 05	1 Sept 04 - 28 Feb 05	1 Mar - 31 Aug 04	1 Sept 03 - 29 Feb 04	1 Mar - 31 Aug 03
CIRA	1				2								
INLA			1		1								
LVF													1
ONH				1									
PIRA													
RIRA	2												1
UDA								2	1	1		1	1
UVF									4		2	1	
Not attributable											1		2
TOTAL	3	0	1	1	3	0	0	2	5	1	3	2	5

¹⁸ The attribution of one murder to CIRA in the period under review reflects its claim of responsibility – see paragraph 2.14 above. We have not included the murder of Kevin McDaid in May 2009, which we consider to have been sectarian but not paramilitary, though members of some paramilitary groups were involved. See paragraphs 2.41 and 2.53 above. In successive earlier reports we included extensive annotations to the following table, for example indicating why we had not included particular murders. We discontinued this practice in our Twelfth Report in October 2006 and we refer readers to those earlier reports for the full details.

- 3.4 The number of murders – 3 – is the equal second highest we have recorded since the first six month period we covered, March to August 2003. It is two years since it has been at this level. All three murders were committed by dissident republicans, as we describe in Section 2 above¹⁹.

The following paramilitary murders took place in the period 1 March to 31 August 2009:

Sapper Patrick Azimkar 7 March 2009

Sapper Mark Quinsey 7 March 2009

PC Stephen Carroll 9 March 2009

- 3.5 The number of *casualties of paramilitary shootings and assaults* from 1 March 2003 to 31 August 2009 was as follows:

Shooting Casualties

Responsible Group	1 Mar-31 Aug 09	1 Sept 08-28 Feb 09	1 Mar – 31 Aug 08	1 Sept 07-29 Feb 08	1 Mar-31 Aug 07	1 Sept 06-28 Feb 07	1 Mar-31 Aug 06	1 Sept 05-28 Feb 06	1 Mar-31 Aug 05	1 Sept 04-28 Feb 05	1 Mar-31 Aug 04	1 Sept 03-29 Feb 04	1 Mar-31 Aug 03
Loyalist	0	2	1	1	1	2	14	36	36	37	39	69	34
Republican	20	7	10	6	0	8	4	2	4	7	11	19	35
TOTAL	20	9	11	7	1	10	18	38	40	44	50	88	69

Assault Casualties

Responsible Group	1 Mar-31 Aug 09	1 Sept 08-28 Feb 09	1 Mar – 31 Aug 08	1 Sept 07-29 Feb 08	1 Mar-31 Aug 07	1 Sept 06-28 Feb 07	1 Mar-31 Aug 06	1 Sept 05-28 Feb 06	1 Mar-31 Aug 05	1 Sept 04-28 Feb 05	1 Mar-31 Aug 04	1 Sept 03-29 Feb 04	1 Mar-31 Aug 03
Loyalist	38	17	10	26	13	14	19	20	39	29	42	57	46
Republican	5	8	6	6	3	5	9	6	16	25	18	26	24
TOTAL	43	25	16	32	16	19	28	26	55	54	60	83	70


- 3.6 The number of shootings has risen very markedly, entirely because of dissident republicans. There were no casualties of loyalist shootings, the first time this has been the case since we started reporting. The figure of 20 casualties is the second highest we have recorded for republicans, the highest - 35 - having been in March-

¹⁹ See paragraphs 2.13-2.14 and 2.26 -2.27 above.

August 2003. It is three years since the total has been of this order, and it was then made up of the victims of both republicans and loyalists.

- 3.7 The number of casualties of assaults – 43 – is the highest since the same six month period in 2005. The increase is entirely the result of loyalist incidents, which have more than doubled compared with the preceding six month period and are at their highest since the period March-August 2005.
- 3.8 The following graphs include the monthly figures we have previously published, updated and extended by six months to 31 August 2009.


PARAMILITARY-STYLE SHOOTINGS: NUMBER OF REPORTED CASUALTIES BETWEEN JANUARY 2003 AND AUGUST 2009



TOTALS OVER THE PERIOD: LOYALIST SHOOTING CASUALTIES - 294

REPUBLICAN SHOOTING CASUALTIES - 144

PARAMILITARY-STYLE ASSAULTS : NUMBER OF REPORTED CASUALTIES BETWEEN JANUARY 2003 AND AUGUST 2009



TOTALS OVER THE PERIOD: LOYALIST PARAMILITARY ASSAULTS - 383

REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY ASSAULTS - 161

Geographical Variations in Paramilitary Violence

3.9 In our four previous autumn reports on paramilitary activity we commented on the very considerable variation in the geographical distribution of the incidents of paramilitary violence and included maps which illustrated it²⁰. We think that it would be helpful to continue this analysis by looking at the position over the 12 months 1 September 2008 to 31 August 2009.

3.10 The maps of Northern Ireland as a whole are produced on the same basis as those in our previous reports and so are directly comparable. The first 3 show:

- The distribution of casualties arising from shootings and assaults combined *by all paramilitary groups*;
- The distribution of casualties arising from *loyalist* shootings and assaults combined;
- The distribution of casualties arising from *republican* shootings and assaults combined.

3.11 The fourth map shows the total number of casualties from shootings and assaults *by both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups* in Belfast.

3.12 The numbers in these maps relate to the local government districts. Annex III gives a key to these districts and contains a technical note.

3.13 In broad terms these maps show that:


- The total number of casualties of loyalist and republican attacks combined over the twelve months under review was higher than in the same period in 2007-08, 97 as against 62;
- There were 9 districts with no casualties (as compared with 8 over the same period in 2007-08); 11 districts with between 1 and 5 casualties (as

²⁰ IMC Seventh Report, October 2005, paragraphs 4.7-4.11; IMC Twelfth Report, October 2006, paragraphs 3.14-3.18; IMC Seventeenth Report, November 2007, paragraphs 3.9-3.13; and IMC Twentieth Report, November 2008, paragraphs 3.9-3.13.

compared with 15); 5 districts with between 6 and 9 (as compared with 2); none between 10 and 20 (the same as before); and 1 - Belfast - with 21 or more (again, the same);


- The casualties of loyalist attacks (57 in total in the twelve months under review as compared with 37 in 2007-08) were concentrated in Belfast and three near-by districts, but extended in smaller numbers in the districts from Belfast up to Coleraine;
- The geographical distribution of the casualties of republican attacks (40 in total as compared with 25) is also somewhat different. There were no reported casualties in districts along the border from Fermanagh to County Down, whereas there were in the previous twelve months. There were more in the area around Belfast;
- Within Belfast the total number of casualties from attacks by both loyalists and republicans increased from 22 to 37. The number of wards with no casualties fell from 37 to 32. As has happened in previous analyses, the pattern has again somewhat changed, with rather more wards with a high number in North and West Belfast. The highest numbers of casualties were in Ardoyne and Upper Springfield (5 or more) and in Shankill and Shaftesbury (3 to 4). The two wards with the highest numbers in 2007-08 (Waterworks and Woodvale) had none in 2008-09.

Casualties as a result of paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland by Local Government District: September 2008-August 2009[†]



Total number of attacks in Northern Ireland = 97


Casualties as a result of paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland where attribution is perceived as Loyalist: September 2008-August 2009[†]



Total number of Loyalist attacks = 57


[†] The numbers on the maps refer to Local Government Districts or Wards (see the key in Annex III) – and not to acts of violence

Casualties as a result of paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland where attribution is perceived as Republican: September 2008-August 2009[†]



Total number of Republican attacks = 40

Casualties as result of paramilitary attacks in the Belfast Local Government District by Ward: September 2008-August 2009[†]



Total number of attacks in Belfast = 37

[†] The numbers on the maps refer to Local Government Districts or Wards (see the key in Annex III) – and not to acts of violence

3.14 Our conclusions for the six months 1 March 2009 to 31 August 2009 are:

- **There were three paramilitary murders in the period under review, the highest number since March-August 2007;**
- **The numbers of casualties of republican shootings (all the result of dissident attacks) and of loyalist assaults rose very sharply and were the highest for six years and four years respectively;**
- **The number of casualties from both shootings and assaults increased from 34 to 63, an increase of 29 or 85% compared with the previous six month period. Compared with the same six month period in 2008 it increased from 27 to 63, an increase of 36, or 133%. The total is the highest for three and a half years;**
- **The combined figure of shooting and assault casualties from loyalist attacks – 38 – was 19 higher than in the previous six month period. This represents an increase of 100%. Compared with the same period in 2008 there was an increase of 27, or 245%. In the latest period the total was made up of 0 shooting casualties (2 in the preceding six months) and 38 assault casualties (17 in the preceding six months). The total is the highest for three and a half years;**
- **The combined figure of shooting and assault casualties from republican attacks – 25 – was 10 higher than in the previous six month period. This represents an increase of 67%. Compared with the same period in 2008 there was an increase of 9, or 56%. In the latest period the total was made up of 20²¹ shooting casualties (7 in the preceding six months) and 5 assault casualties (8 in the preceding six months). The total is the highest for four and a half years;**
- **Averaged out for all paramilitary groups, there were between two and three victims every week;**

²¹ This figure includes the 2 soldiers and 2 civilians who were shot and wounded in the Massereene Barracks incident in March 2009 – see paragraph 2.26-2.27 above.

- Dissident republicans were responsible for all of the shooting casualties and loyalists for 88% of the assault casualties;
- PIRA were not responsible for any of these incidents²²;
- The changes may be summarised as follows:

Loyalist Groups

- Shooting casualties were down from 2 to 0 compared with the preceding six month period and down from 1 to 0 compared with the same period in 2008;
- Assault casualties were up by 124% from 17 to 38 compared with the preceding six month period and up by 280% from 10 to 38 compared with the same period in 2008. The total is the highest since March to August 2005;

Republican Groups

- Shooting casualties were up by 186% from 7 to 20 compared with the preceding six month period and up by 100% from 10 to 20 compared with the same period in 2008. The total is the highest since March to August 2003;
- Assault casualties were down by 38% from 8 to 5 compared with the preceding six month period and down by 17% from 6 to 5 compared with the same period in 2008.

Geographical Variations

- The analysis shows as it has in previous years that the geographical distribution of casualties is subject to considerable variation.

²² We have noted in all our reports of this type since our Eighth in February 2006 that PIRA as an organisation had not been responsible for any of the casualties of paramilitary shootings or assaults.

4. LEADERSHIP

- 4.1 Article 4 of the International Agreement requires us to assess whether the leadership of paramilitary groups is directing illegal activities or seeking to prevent them.
- 4.2 We continue to apply here the standards we think should be observed by people in positions of leadership in political parties and in groups associated with paramilitary groups which we originally set out four and a half years ago in the Spring of 2005²³. They are that those in leadership should articulate their opposition to all forms of illegality, should exert their influence against members of paramilitary groups who have not given up crime, and should give clear support to the criminal justice system.

Sinn Féin and PIRA

- 4.3 In our Twenty-First Report we reiterated the view we had expressed in September 2008, namely that the leadership of the republican movement remained firmly committed to following the political path; that it would not be diverted from it; and that PIRA had completely relinquished the leadership and other structures appropriate to a time of conflict.
- 4.4 This remains our clear view. Senior figures have continued to give leadership to the republican community to refrain from violent and other crime, to adhere to the exclusively political path, and to reject the dissident republicans who want to destroy the peace process, pointing out the futility of their actions and the lack of a political strategy on their part. A striking example was the condemnation by the Sinn Féin leadership of the three murders and other injuries caused by dissident republicans in March 2009 and the way in which it encouraged people to support the police in the apprehension of the perpetrators. Sinn Féin has also pressed for the early devolution of policing and justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive.

²³ IMC Fifth Report, May 2005, paragraphs 1.15-1.17 and 8.9-8.10.

The PUP and the UVF

- 4.5 In our Twenty-First Report we made no change to the assessment we had made six months before. We said that the leadership of the UVF remained committed to and was continuing to implement the strategy it had announced in May 2007. As a result there had been a further reduction in assaults and criminal activity and a winding down of operational structures. The leadership had also been successful in its efforts to prevent a violent reaction on the part of members to the dissident republican murders in March 2009, although these had fallen outside our then reporting period. Decommissioning was then the main outstanding issue and we expressed the hope that the leadership of the PUP would be able to help persuade the UVF of the implications of a failure to deliver it soon.
- 4.6 The very significant and positive progress we report in Section 2 above, particularly on decommissioning, is further evidence of the commitment of the leadership to the May 2007 strategy, its coherence and its ability to deliver to a plan²⁴. It has been possible only because of the effective leadership provided at the top. There remain further challenges, as we suggest above, but we have reason to believe that the leadership will rise to them, as it has risen to those so far.

The UPRG and the UDA

- 4.7 We referred in our Twenty-First Report to our continuing belief that the leadership of the UDA was committed to changing the organisation and to channelling efforts towards community development. We said that the absence of a violent reaction on the part of members to the dissident republican murders in March 2009 (which fell outside our then reporting period) reflected a conscious exercise of leadership and recognition of the counter-productive nature of a violent reaction. We remained concerned however about the role of the leadership in respect of exiling. We said that the most urgent challenge was decommissioning.
- 4.8 The progress we report in Section 2 above reflects well on the leadership of the mainstream UDA and that of the South East Antrim group²⁵. For the mainstream, it indicates a coherence of purpose and capacity to deliver within a very disparate

²⁴ See paragraphs 2.50-2.54 above.

²⁵ See paragraphs 2.39-2.48 above.

organisation which we believed many in the leadership aspired to but for which there had previously been too little concrete evidence. This is why these events are significant. We hope that the same strength of purpose and clarity of direction will be evidenced in the coming months to complete decommissioning and tackle the organisation's other challenges.

5. THE DEVOLUTION OF POLICING AND JUSTICE TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE

5.1 We have in this report identified the range and tempo of dissident republican activities as the most serious current threat. There are security and intelligence contributions to be made to addressing the developing problems. However, the early devolution of policing and justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive could provide a potent intervention. This would not be because the dissidents would be impressed by it. It would be because policing and justice would no longer be a point of contention across the political divide; rather, it would be a platform for co-operation against those trying to undermine the peace process.

6. OTHER ISSUES

Paramilitaries and the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland

- 6.1 We have commented in some of our recent Reports on the operation of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland as it affects our responsibility to monitor the activities of paramilitary groups²⁶. We have drawn attention to some specific issues such as the disclosure of prosecution material to the defence and the recovery of criminal assets. And we have said that as circumstances became more normal it is important that the operation of all the criminal justice agencies and the contribution of the general public are directed to Northern Ireland's evolving needs.
- 6.2 We believe that issues of this kind fall within our remit in respect of paramilitary groups – to monitor, assess, report and recommend any remedial action we consider necessary²⁷. Notwithstanding the significant success that the criminal justice and other agencies have had in dealing with paramilitaries, we have some concerns about what the outcomes have been in the kind of cases on which we have been reporting. We will continue our consideration of these issues with a view to returning to them again.

Employment and other difficulties for former paramilitaries

- 6.3 Our attention has from time to time been drawn to an issue raised earlier this year in the Report of the Consultative Group on the Past, namely the limitations on the opportunities available to former paramilitary prisoners. The Group said it was persuaded that more should be done to foster the integration into society of those “with conflict-related convictions” and recommended the implementation of the findings of the Quigley-Hamilton working group²⁸.

²⁶ IMC Twenty-First Report, May 2009, Section 5, page 27; IMC Twentieth Report, November 2008, paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6; IMC Seventeenth Report, November 2007, paragraph 5.2; and IMC Fifteenth Report, April 2007, Section 5, pages 30 – 31.

²⁷ Article 4 of the International Agreement under which we are established sets out our remit; Article 7 confers on us the power to make recommendations; and both are governed by our objective in Article 3, to promote “the transition to a peaceful society and stable and inclusive devolved Government in Northern Ireland”. See Annex I below and paragraph 1.3 above.

²⁸ Report of the Consultative Group on the Past, January 2009, pages 29 and 81. Consultation Paper - Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland: the Recommendations of the Consultative Group on the Past, Northern Ireland Office, June 2009.

- 6.4 We are very aware that former paramilitary prisoners (and indeed, former paramilitaries who have never been convicted) can and do change their views, reject the use of violence and commit themselves to peaceful means. In previous reports, as in this one, we have referred to the constructive role that such people can come to play in the development of their communities and in bringing people together across the divide. Sometimes their past may give them a standing which facilitates the constructive contribution they are able to make.
- 6.5 We therefore want to add our weight to what the Consultative Group said in this regard. We recognise that the issues are complex and that the case of each person has to be judged on its individual merits. But we are persuaded that it is right to work so as to remove obstacles to employment and to access to the full range of services so that people who have genuinely left paramilitarism behind and are not involved in crime can play a full part in their community and in the economy. We hope that this issue will be given consideration by the British Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive.

ANNEX I

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UK AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND – ARTICLES 4 AND 7

Article 4

In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups, the Commission shall:

(a) monitor any continuing activity by paramilitary groups including:

- i. attacks on the security forces, murders, sectarian attacks, involvement in riots, and other criminal offences;
- ii. training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons and other preparations for terrorist campaigns;
- iii. punishment beatings and attacks and exiling;

(b) assess:

- i. whether the leaderships of such organisations are directing such incidents or seeking to prevent them; and
- ii. trends in security incidents.

(c) report its findings in respect of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article to the two Governments at six-monthly intervals; and, at the joint request of the two Governments, or if the Commission sees fit to do so, produce further reports on paramilitary activity on an ad hoc basis.

Article 7

When reporting under Articles 4 and 6 of this Agreement, the Commission, or in the case of Article 6(2), the relevant members thereof shall recommend any remedial action considered necessary. The Commission may also recommend what measures, if any, it considers might appropriately be taken by the Northern Ireland Assembly, such measures being limited to those which the Northern Ireland Assembly has power to take under relevant United Kingdom legislation.

ANNEX II

THE IMC'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES

These guiding principles were set out in the statement the IMC issued on 9 March 2004.

- The rule of law is fundamental in a democratic society.
- We understand that there are some strongly held views about certain aspects of the legal framework, for example the special provisions applying to terrorism, and that those holding these views will continue to seek changes. But obedience to the law is incumbent on every citizen.
- The law can be legitimately enforced only by duly appointed and accountable law enforcement officers or institutions. Any other forcible imposition of standards is unlawful and undemocratic.
- Violence and the threat of violence can have no part in democratic politics. A society in which they play some role in political or governmental affairs cannot – in the words of Article 3 – be considered either peaceful or stable.
- Political parties in a democratic and peaceful society, and all those working in them, must not in any way benefit from, or be associated with, illegal activity of any kind, whether involving violence or the threat of it, or crime of any kind, or the proceeds of crime. It is incumbent on all those engaged in democratic politics to ensure that their activities are untainted in any of these ways.
- It is not acceptable for any political party, and in particular for the leadership, to express commitment to democratic politics and the rule of law if they do not live up to those statements and do all in their power to ensure that those they are in a position to influence do the same.

ANNEX III

MAPS SHOWING THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE IN SECTION 3: TECHNICAL NOTE AND KEY TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISTRICTS

The maps following paragraph 3.13 showing the geographical distribution of paramilitary violence over the 12 months from 1 September 2008 to 31 August 2009, are based on local government District areas for Northern Ireland as a whole and on wards for Belfast. The maps below give a key by which individual areas can be identified.

Technical Note

Maps of this kind can be produced only if a valid postcode is associated with the incident. All of the 97 paramilitary attacks (which include both shootings and assaults) during the period 1 September 2008 to 31 August 2009, had a valid postcode (as verified against the 2006 Central Postcode Directory), for the location of the attack and are therefore included in this analysis. The maps use 1993 Local Government District and Ward boundaries.

The attribution of a paramilitary-style attack to either a Loyalist or Republican category is based on information available to investigating officers at the time of the attack.

Figures for the current year are provisional and may be subject to minor amendment.

Tables 1 and 2 of the Annex include a community background breakdown of the population of each Northern Ireland Local Government District and for the Belfast wards. Community background is based on a person's current religious group, if any, or the religious group in which they were brought up for people who do not regard themselves as belonging to any religion. The proportions are based on data from the 2001 Census, which took place on 29 April 2001 and have been rounded to the nearest whole number. The category 'Protestant' includes those respondents who gave their religion as Protestant or other Christian/Christian related. The category 'Catholic' includes those who gave their religion as Catholic or Roman Catholic.

Outline map of Northern Ireland by Local Government District




Table 1

<i>Local Government District</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>	<i>Local Government District</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>
Antrim	1	57/39	Down	14	35/62
Ards	2	83/13	Dungannon	15	38/61
Armagh	3	50/49	Fermanagh	16	40/59
Ballymena	4	76/21	Larne	17	72/25
Ballymoney	5	66/32	Limavady	18	42/57
Banbridge	6	66/31	Lisburn	19	63/33
Belfast	7	49/47	Magherafelt	20	35/64
Carrickfergus	8	85/9	Moyle	21	38/60
Castlereagh	9	77/18	Newry and Mourne	22	18/81
Coleraine	10	69/27	Newtownabbey	23	76/19
Cookstown	11	41/58	North Down	24	80/13
Craigavon	12	53/45	Omagh	25	30/69
Derry	13	23/75	Strabane	26	33/66

Outline map of Belfast Local Government District by Ward




Table 2

<i>Ward</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>	<i>Ward</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>
Andersonstown	1	1 / 99	Glencolin	27	1 / 98
Ardoyne	2	3 / 96	Highfield	28	94 / 4
Ballyhackamore	3	80 / 12	Island	29	90 / 5
Ballymacarrett	4	47 / 51	Knock	30	90 / 5
Ballynafeigh	5	33 / 59	Ladybrook	31	12 / 87
Ballysillan	6	91 / 4	Legoniel	32	59 / 38
Beechmount	7	4 / 92	Malone	33	38 / 56
Bellevue	8	35 / 61	Musgrave	34	37 / 60
Belmont	9	90 / 4	New Lodge	35	2 / 97
Blackstaff	10	91 / 4	Orangefield	36	91 / 3
Bloomfield	11	88 / 5	Ravenhill	37	67 / 26
Botanic	12	23 / 67	Rosetta	38	37 / 58
Castlevue	13	64 / 31	Shaftesbury	39	58 / 37
Cavehill	14	45 / 51	Shankill	40	94 / 3
Cherryvalley	15	85 / 9	Stormont	41	85 / 9
Chichester Park	16	20 / 75	Stranmillis	42	44 / 48
Cliftonville	17	29 / 68	Sydenham	43	90 / 4
Clonard	18	3 / 96	The Mount	44	90 / 4
Crumlin	19	94 / 4	Upp. Malone	45	69 / 25
Duncairn	20	90 / 6	Upp. Springfield	46	3 / 97
Falls	21	3 / 97	Waterworks	47	7 / 91
Falls Park	22	2 / 98	Whiterock	48	1 / 99
Finaghy	23	50 / 45	Windsor	49	47 / 43
Fortwilliam	24	64 / 33	Woodstock	50	87 / 6
Glen Road	25	2 / 97	Woodvale	51	95 / 3
Glencairn	26	85 / 12			